

Tuesday, August 9, 2005 2005 Summer Seminar Series, # 6

FOREIGN AID and THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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http://www.usaid.gov/ Keyword: Summer Seminars



Foreign Aid and the War on Terrorism

Defining Development's Role in Combating Terrorism

By

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Structure of the Presentation

- I. Purpose
- II. Understanding Terrorism
- III. Role of Development
- IV. Causes
- V. Country Contexts
- VI. Strategies
- VII. Entry Points



II. Understanding Terrorism

A weak base of primary sources:

- Terrorist's publicly-issued statements
- Terrorist's documents found during investigations
- Databases of terrorist events
 - State Department
 - ITERATE
 - RAND-St. Andrews
- Extremely few interviews with terrorists



Terrorism Defined

- U.S. Code: "Pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." [Title 22, Section 2656f(d)]
- Main defining characteristics:
 - 1. Targets civilians & non-combatants
 - 2. Aims to produce public fear or panic
 - 3. Exerts pressure on government for political change
 - 4. Seeks media attention



Terrorism Classified by Type

First Tier – Three major categories

Pathological terrorism

Criminal terrorism

Political terrorism

Second Tier – Political terrorism composed of . . .

State terrorism

State supported terrorism

Substate terrorism

Third Tier – Substate terrorism composed of . . .

Social revolutionary terrorism

Right-Wing terrorism


Nationalist-separatist terrorism

Religious extremist terrorism

Single issue terrorism



Who is the Terrorist?





What do Terrorists Hope to Accomplish?

- 1. To challenge the state's authority
- 2. To dramatize a cause
- 3. To demoralize the government
- 4. To gain popular support
- 5. To provoke regime violence
- 6. To inspire followers
- 7. To overcome a weakening organization
- 8. To accelerate the pace of violence
- 9. To dominate a wider resistance movement



III. Role of Development

- Evolution of terrorism since 1980's
- Traditional responses increased security, policy enforcement, use of force, restrictive legislation – may be necessary, but is not enough
- Terrorism is a problem to be managed but perhaps never entirely eliminated
- To provide strong incentives not to choose terrorism
- To win the peace: not *counter*terrorism, as such; but *pro*peace, *pro*-security, *pro*-democracy and *pro*-progress
- Search for interventions the inverse relation to terrorism



IV. Causes

- Macro-level Causes: Modernization, communication, transportation, new weapons, urbanization, globalization, free trade, culture, religion, social habits, historical traditions, ideologies, clientelistic society, lack of security, political regime type, social movements, political oppression, inequality, relative deprivation, lack of prosperity, global dependency, lack of state legitimacy, political instability, state failure, changes in the international paradigm, contagion
- *Messo-level Causes*: Group dynamics, collective rational choice



V. Country Contexts


- Widespread mobilization and on-going conflict
- Suppressed terrorism at the expense of democratic reforms
- Moderate governments with populations tending to extremism
- Provide sanctuary due to state weakness
- Assets terrorist may exploit
- Unforeseen "windows of opportunity"



VI. Achieving Strategic Advantage



Terrorism emerges from youth "at-risk" in transition





Acts of terrorism emerge from terrorist groups





Terrorism emerges as a by-product of a once-peaceful social movement

- Strategy: Intervene at the level of the peaceful social movement.
 - Satisfy local causes and grievances expressed prior to the radicalization of the movement.
 - Unravel support for the violent terrorist group from the bottom up.



Terrorism emerges from specific social segments prone to extremism and violence


- Strategy: Intervene next to moderate, progressive segments of society.
- Empower them to regain the leadership so that extreme, violence-prone segments decline in importance.



VII. Entry Points



Different regime types have different effects on terrorism



Transition from Totalitarian to Democratic Regime



Mixed effects of democracy on terrorism

- ↑ Democratic Participation = ↓ Terrorism
- ◆ 个 Civil Liberties = 个 Terrorism

- Suggests a balance between programs to promote political rights and civil liberties
- Suggest political participation interventions may reduce terrorism . . . But how?



Interventions promoting political participation

- Voting & Elections
- Political parties
- Legislatures & political systems
- Decentralization
- Local governance
- Civil society
- Consultative mechanisms



Centrism: Aggregating political opinion

- Voting & Elections associated with decline in terrorism
- Political parties 2 to 3 party systems
- Legislative systems: proportional v. majoritarian
- Decentralization
- Local governance
- Civil society
- Consultative mechanisms



Development hypotheses: "If ..., then"

- If donors fund successful democratization programs, then support for terrorism will decrease over the long-run, but violence may increase until the democracy is well established.
- If donors fund democratization programs which balance political participation with aggregation of mass public opinion, then it will discourage violence conflict and terrorism.



Conclusions

- Terrorism is an extremely "contextual" development issue.
- Terrorism is a cross-cutting development issue.
- Terrorism requires close coordination with the two other D's – Defense and Diplomacy
- Terrorism will not divert us from our development vocation; it will strengthen it, but only if we think through the causal relations between interventions and terrorism.



Edwin Hullander, PPC/P





Global War on Terrorism Taking Stock








Terrorist Network/Structure


TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORKS







GWOT National Strategy




- DEFEND homeland
- DEFEAT terrorist
- DENY resources
- DIMINISH conditions





CT INTERAGENCY ACTIONS







Deny Recruits: At Risk Youth



We spend billions of dollars each year to protect against terrorist attaches and they only spend a few hundreds to train a terrorist.


What are we doing wrong?

--Donald Rumsfeld, Sec. of Defense





Terrorist Recruiting Cycle Cleric







Deny Recruits: Programs

- Secular Education>>>>>>>Radical Madrassa
 Community Based Alternative to Radical Indoctrination
- Skills Training/Job Creation>>>>>Alienated Youth
 Employable Skills & Jobs to Contribute to Community
- Community Commitment>>>>>>Violent Actions
 Constructive Political Participation instead of Supporting Violence
- Group Dynamics>>>><<<<Radical Cleric Influence
 Community or Social Organizations for Youth Involvement





Deny Funds: Money Laundering









07/19/00

\$9,985

08/07/00

\$9,485

08/30/00

\$19,985

09/18/00

\$69,985

Citibank New York, NY

Account Owner



Marwan Al-Shehhi AA Flight 175 Pilot SunTrust Bank
Gulf Coast, FL

Account Owner



Mohamed Atta AA Flight 11 Pilot





Deny Funds: Terrorist Finance

G8/FSAT>>>>FATF 40+8 Reqt. >>>FIU/EGMONT member

Financial Crimes Laws (Money Laundering)

Judicial Trn.	Bank TA	Fin Inst.	Non Fin. Inst
Judges	Bk. Regs.	Com Bks.	Hawalas
Prosecutor	FIU Ops	Inv./Trust Fnds.	Charities
Investigators	Bk. Exam.	Insurance Co.	NGOs

Asset Seizures Wire Transfer/Cash Currier/Commodities
Conviction Skimming/Smuggling/Trafficking





Deny Sanctuary: Terrorist Camps



We have more to fear from failed states than we do from large armies or navies.


-- President George W. Bush National Security Strategy







Deny Sanctuary: Terrorist Camps







Terrorist Sanctuary: Criteria

Terrorist Criteria

- Remote / Rural Location
- Predominantly Muslim Population in area
- Lack of Military or Police Presence or Support
- Lack of Public Services
- Disaffected Groups
- High Unemployment / Low Economic Opportunities


Terrorist Operations

- Regional Headquarters
- Base for Planning Attacks
- Base for Recruiting, Training and Indoctrination
- Base for Local and Regional Fund Raising
- Base for Building Community Support and Protection





Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism







Trans Sahal Joint Assessment

- Military Assessment
- Terrorist Establishing Regional Base of Operations
- Cross Border Flow of Materials
- Build Islamic Community Support /Cooperation
- Build Local Funding Base
- Build Local Recruiting Base
- Resistance to Authority

- USAID Assessment
- Large "at-risk" youth cohort
- High Unemployment or Low Economic Opportunities
- Large Shadow Economy and Cross Border Trade Flows
- Discontent Muslim Community
- Lack of Public Services
- Distrust of Military/Police





Trans Sahel CT Programs

Military Support

- Train Four Counties Military and Border Patrol Units
- Equip Military for Trans Sahel
 Communication/Coordination
- Train Military in Civil Affairs and Community Support
- Develop Regional Military to Military Cooperation
- Train Military in Human Rights

Development Support

- Job Training / Youth Centers
 Solider Reintegration programs
- Job Creation in Community linked with skill training
- Water projects to build local economic base
- Train Judiciary and Local Officials in Public Service
- Local Radio Service



Questions and Answers





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